| by
Bryan Singer |
Think
of what happens when you buy a new PC, take it home, and plug it into
your high-speed Internet line for the first time. You immediately enter
a world where you can track down information in seconds, rather than in
hours or days. Such a capability can overwhelmingly increase the productivity
of your time. But you also find that your system is exposed to the outside
world. Now you have to guard against information thieves and pranksters
who seem to have no motive except self-entertainment for the damage they
try to do.
The same risks and rewards occur in the modern production system. Internet-based
technology has amply increased the productivity of factories, but the
simple act of giving an Internet protocol access to a plant-floor device
makes it a potential Internet target. Everything on Internet-based systems,
from trade secrets to the main control system of a production line, needs
protection from this new set of risks.
No longer does a miscreant have to enter your premises to take or copy
documents in order to steal your intellectual property or disrupt business
operations. Anyone, anywhere, with a computer can do it over the Internet.
Saboteursthose who bear you a grudge and those who think damage
is funnycan reach into your system by the same route.
 |
| Logging on from a console inside
the control room is proof of having passed several layers of security.
But, there must be some means of identification to establish what
tasks this person may perform. |
In managing risk of any kind, including risk associated with our information
systems, the challenge we have as manufacturers is in knowing what to
protect and how to protect it. Companies need to protect the systems that
provide value to their businesses, but they must apply protection in proportion
to the risk and value. Manufacturers face the dual challenge of protecting
information on the shop floor as well as the production processes themselves.
As a result, manufacturers must possess the necessary capabilities to
prevent common security problems while also managing wanted change and
responding to unwanted change.
However, there is no such thing as invincible security. Despite the best
protection available, there are still vulnerabilities that may or may
not be known within an organization. The human element of security always
leaves the possibility of error, and no plan can protect against new threats
to the environment. Consequently, once all the possible prevention methods
are in place, companies must focus on "Plan B" activities,
which will enable the company to recover if a security event does occur.
"Plan B" activities include incident response, post-incident
analysis, and business continuity planning.
Too little security, of course, puts people, processes, and profits at
risk. Having too much security at the wrong time can pose risks of unnecessary
expenses or restrict accessibility to authorized people during emergencies.
Companies need to evaluate and balance the level of exposure with the
value of what is being protected.
For example, for dial-in access to the corporate IT network, it is often
a good idea to deny access to any caller who gets his password wrong three
times in a row. But is striking out on three a good idea, if it bars an
operator racing to shut down a runaway reactor? Unique needs and risks
require a unique balance of security measures.
Security for the Factory
Floor
Technologies like firewalls and encryption protect us from people we don't
knowhackers and crackers. Most manufacturing managers find that
these defenses can help with securing the factory floor.
Inside the firewall, we're protecting critical manufacturing and
process knowledge such as production schedules, production rates, customer
information, process conditions, product specifications, recipes, operating
procedures, quality data, and historical data from sensors and control
systems. Here we see the need for an additional barrier that filters network
traffic and isolates the plant floor from the rest of the enterprise,
ensuring that errant network traffic, including e-mail, is blocked from
causing potential harm to intellectual property and production assets.
Inside the firewall we also need to protect ourselves from people we do
knowour employees and partners. In these cases, it is not necessary
to worry as much about intentional attacks as about accidental attacks.
This is also where companies typically get complacent with security policies.
Encryption may not be a critical need here, but capabilities like authentication
and role-based authorization are valuable in ensuring the security of
the plant.
Consider the operator trying to tame the runaway reactor. Logging on from
a console inside the control room is proof of having passed several layers
of security. Even so, there must be some means of identification to establish
what tasks this person entering the network is authorized to perform.
Identifying a Process
So, how do we protect the information and processes inside the perimeter?
One way is to implement user authentication at the door between the inner
and outer areas, using role, location, and process-based authentication.
Think of it as the definition and enforcement of who can do what and from
where.
Depending on the roles established on the plant floor, engineers and technicians
are probably the only ones who should touch the equipment, and user access
should be limited to these people.
If there is a critical process that must be overseen by engineers, they
may need to be close to the process. Having plant floor technologies with
authentication built in makes the application of security much easier.
Many technology providers and service consultants, including Rockwell
Automation, have begun to focus on security as a critical business issue,
and can help plan and build an effective defense, using concepts like
authentication.
No Shortcuts
Security is not just about technology. A white paper titled "The
True Meaning of Security," issued by a company that knows about
global networking, MCI Inc., concludes that security is only 20 percent
technology. The remaining 80 percent involves what the paper calls "the
four Ps of security"People, Policies, Processes, and Procedures.
People must know security processes and procedures, and must follow them.
Continual training is necessary to keep employees informed and aware of
what they must do to protect the factory and its information.
Policies are put in place by management and describe how people are expected
to comply with the processes and procedures, and management must enforce
those polices and procedures. Processes are the systematic series of actions
needed to accomplish a goalin this case, to protect business assets.
Procedures are the detailed steps that carry out the security policy.
The essential message here is that, while technology today can provide
a baseline for security on many levels, the best-laid plans can be quickly
undone by one employee who shortcuts a security process, shares a password,
or ignores a policy. Applying the four Ps of security requires a company-wide
investment in training and constant communication with employees. But,
it offers the best return and creates an environment that stresses security
as a critical business function.
It's important to see security as an ongoing investment. Systems,
software, employees, and other aspects of business are continually evolving.
To properly apply the four Ps and maintain a consistently secure environment,
companies have to evolve the application of security, too.
For companies just starting to think about security, this may seem daunting.
But, in the long run, what you secure now will support your future.
Bryan Singer is a senior business consultant at
Rockwell Automation and chairman of the Instrumentation, Systems, and
Automation Society's SP-99 committee on manufacturing and control
systems security.
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